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Introduction
Recent headlines in the New York Times1 and the Wall Street Journal2
describing anti-trust activity by Common Market authorities against an
American company, Continental Can of New York, might lead one to
believe that the European Economic Community is pursuing a vigorous
extra-territorial application of its anti-trust rules. The purpose of this paper
is to show that in reality the case is not so clear-cut that a vigorous
enforcement policy has generally been adopted. Further, it is planned to
show that true extraterritorial application 3 of Articles 85 and 86 is rare,
and that, at least in the application of Article 85, there has been no
discernible pattern of discrimination against American firms.
In discussing Articles 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty, mention will be
made of some general definitional concepts as developed by EEC Commis-
sion and Court of Justice practice as well as by legal commentators, and
the writer will then concentrate on the extraterritorial application of these
sections. Public international law limitations on the extra-territorial reach
of antitrust laws, 4 or the practical problems of EEC enforcement of its
anti-trust measures outside the Common Market will not be considered.
*B.S. Manhattan College (1965), J.D. Harvard Law School (1968), LL.M. (Comparative
and Foreign Law) N.Y.U. Law School (1972); Member, New York Bar.
"'EEC Trust Rule Hits U.S. Concern," New York Times, December 14, 197 1, p. 67;
David Blake, "Common Market vs. Continental Can," Section 3, New York Times, Decem-
.ber 19, 1971, pp. I, II "U.S. Can Maker Faces Court Action," New York Times, June 29,
1972, p. 57.2
"Continental Can Loses Unusual Antitrust Case in the Common Market," Wall Street
Journal, December 14, 1971, p. I1: "Continental Can Co. Expected To Propose Settlement
Plan to EC," Wall Street Journal, March 23, 1972, p. 4; "Continental Can Says Case Against
a Unit In Europe Moves Along," Wall Street Journal, April 26, 1972, p. 10.
3Within the EEC anti-trust context it is submitted that "true extraterritorial application"
applies only to the utilisation of Articles 85 and 86 to attack activities outside the Common
Market of either EEC or non-EEC firms. However, the application of EEC anti-trust rules to
the business activities of non-EEC companies within the Common Market will also be
discussed.4For the European view, see M. Robert Kruithof, The Application of the Common
Market Anti-Trust Provisions to International Restraints of Trade, 2 COMMON MARKET L.
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Chapter I. Article 85:
Ban on Restrictive Agreements and Practices
A. The Concept of Enterprise
Since Article 85(1) prohibits "all agreements between enterprises, all
decisions by associations of enterprises," 5 a definition of the term "enter-
prise" is of essential importance. According to Graupner, "(t)his is not a
legal term found in the general law of any of the Member States nor is it
defined in the Treaty. It is now however recognized as referring to any
economic unit-either a single individual or several individuals combined
in a partnership or corporation..."6
Deringer emphasizes the legal aspect of the concept: "A legal entity,
irrespective of its legal form or its position with regard to property rights, is
therefore essential for an enterprise within the meaning of cartel law
generally and of Article 85(1) in particular. 7 ... the term 'enterprise' re-
quires legal independence. It is doubtful whether it also requires economic
independence .... 8
McLachlan and Swann,9 and a note in the 1965 Stanford Law Review, 10
also stress that "enterprise" is mainly an economic concept whose exis-
tence or lack of existence must be established by the EEC Commission on
a factual, case-by-case basis. The author's own view is that "enterprise" in
the EEC context has both some legal and some economic meaning. Thus it
must be a legal entity capable of entering into binding agreements, and
assuming rights and obligations. Further, it must constitute an identifiable
economic entity with some effective factual independence.
Since there is no geographical delimitation of "enterprise" in the Rome
Treaty, the concept covers companies incorporated and having their main
seats outside the Common Market:
Neither Articles 85 to 90 nor Regulation No. 17 have an express provision,
REV. 69 (1964-5). For the broader American position, see, RESTATEMENT SECOND, FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S., American Law Institute Publishers, St. Paul, 1965, Sections
18, 40, and the Comments to these Sections.
5Ail references to the Rome Treaty are to the English version in ERIC STEIN & PETER
HAY, DOCUMENTS FOR LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE ATLANTIC AREA, Bobbs-Merrill Co.,
Indianapolis, 1967. The EEC Treaty in English may also be found, inter alia, in 298 U.N.T.S.
3(1958), and in CCH COMMON MARKET REPORTER.6RUDOLF GRAUPNER, THE RULES OF COMPETITION IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COM-
MUNITY, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1965, p. II.
7ARVED DERINGER, THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMU-
NITY, Commerce Clearing House, Chicago, 1968, pp. 5-6.
81d., at 8.
9 D. L. MCLACHLAN & D. SWANN, COMPETITION POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY, Oxford U. Press, London, 1967, p. 130.
1 0Note, The Substantive Rules of Anti-trust in the Common Market: Analysis and
Approach, 17 STANFORD L. REV. 257 (1965), p. 263.
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whether they apply to enterprises outside the Common Market or not. There-
fore the answer only depends on whether the cartel a) restricts competition
within the Common Market, and b) is likely to affect trade between Member
States. It is, however, of no importance if the enterprises concerned are
residing within the Common Market or outside it. Therefore even an, agree-
ment between two or more Common Market enterprises may not fall under
Article 85(1)... On the other hand, an agreement between one enterprise
within the Common Market and another outside it, e.g., a license agreement,
or even between two or more enterprises outside the Common Market may
violate Article 85(I), if the two conditions mentioned above are met.11
Von der Groeben, a member of the EEC Commission, has stated that
the Commission will "apply the rules of competition to all restraint of
competition in the Common Market, whether it is practiced by firms inside
or outside the Community."' 12
One practical problem in defining what constitutes a single enterprise is
of particular interest to the international, but American based and con-
trolled, conglomerates with subsidiaries in various countries: Are the par-
ent and subsidiary companies, or two subsidiaries of the same parent, to be
regarded as separate enterprises which, therefore, are subject to Article 85
concerning their restrictive trade agreements with each other?
B. The Parent-subsidiary Relationship
A Commission decision of June 18, 1969, granted negative clearance
and thus approved an admittedly trade-restrictive agreement between
Christiani & Nielsen AIS, Denmark, and its wholly owned subsidiary,
Christiani & Nielsen, Holland.13
This important decision deserves quotation at some length:
In order for Article 85, paragraph I, of the Treaty to be applicable, however,
there must be competition between the enterprises concerned that could be
restricted. This condition is not necessarily fulfilled in dealings between two
enterprises operating in the same economic field, merely because each of
these enterprises has a separate legal personality. In this connection, it must
be determined on the basis of the facts, whether it is possible for the sub-
sidiary to take an economic measure independently of the parent company...
For reasons of management, this enterprise, whose activities are in-
ternational, formed subsidiaries in various countries rather than establish
branches or agencies. What is involved here is an element of market strategy
that does not result in the conclusion that, in this case, a wholly-owned
subsidiary is an economic entity that can compete with its par-
ent ... Christiani & Nielsen, The Hague, is, therefore, an integral part of the
economic whole of the Christiani & Nielsen group... The division of markets
'
1 Arved Deringer, The Common Market Competition Rules, with Particular Reference
to Non-Member Countries, 12 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 582 (1963), pp. 584-585.12Hans von der Groeben, Competition Policy As Part of Economic Policy in the Com-
mon Market, 10 ANTITRUST BULL. 911 (1965), p. 926.
13CCH COMMON MARKET REP. Section 9308.
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provided for in the agreement is, therefore, only a division of labor within the
same economic entity. Under these circumstances, it cannot be expected that
one part of this entity-even though it has a separate legal personality-will
compete with the parent company.14
In its recent decision concerning distribution arrangements by the EEC,
national subsidiaries of the American Eastman Kodak Company, the Com-
mission found that the subsidiaries were so controlled by the American
parent that the whole group constituted a single enterprise.' 5 Although the
Court of Justice in Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH,16 failed to
deal with this issue, Advocate General Roemer, relying on the Commis-
sions's position in Christiani & Nielsen and Kodak, argued that Article
85(1) was inapplicable to a mere division of functions within a single
economic entity, when there was no competition as the subsidiary was
subject to the parent's full control and instructions. 17
An interesting twist was provided by the July 24, 1969 Commission
decision against ten Dyestuff Manufacturers,'8 in which it was emphasized
that the parent producers were fined for ordering their fully controlled EEC
subsidiaries to engage in illegal, trade restrictive practices: "Proof of the
existence of concerted practices was found on the part of the various
producers, irrespective of whether their head office was within or outside
of the Common Market, and not on the part of their subsidiaries or
representatives. The instructions to these subsidiaries or representatives to
raise their prices were binding."' 19
Markert notes the paradox in the Dyestuff case that, although the Com-
mission expressly stated that the four non-EEC producers were fined for
acts attributable to them and not for the acts of their EEC subsidiaries,
"the Commission said that since the EEC subsidiaries of Ciba, Geigy,
Sandoz, and I.C.I. were entirely controlled by their parents and therefore
within their domain, it was sufficient to effect service (of the decision
imposing the fines) at the location of their subsidiaries." 20
The commentators agree with the Commission that a parent and its
wholly owned subsidiaries be considered as a single enterprise. According
to McLachlan and Swann, "(i)t would be unreasonable to expect a
wholly-owned subsidiary to compete with the parent company and in this
141d., at 8659.
"5CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9378 (June 30, 1970).
16 CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 8106 (June 8, 1971).
171d., at 7199.
18 CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9314.
191d., at 869 1.
20Kurt E. Markert, The Dyestuff Case: A Contribution to the Relationship between the
Antitrust Laws of'the European Economic Community and its Member States, 14 ANTITRUST
BULL. 869 (1969), p. 897.
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case common sense would treat the two as one enterprise." 2' Lang rea-
soned "(i)f neither competition nor formal legal arrangements (that would
permit the companies to compete at arm's length) exist between the associ-
ated companies, it is submitted that they constitute a single enterprise and
are free to enter into anti-competitive arrangements with each other." 22
Graupner,23 Schwartz, 24 and Deringer 25 are all in accord, stressing that a
subsidiary must have a measure of economic independence before it will be
treated as a separate enterprise.
Thus the Commission and the legal writers hold that in examining each
parent-subsidiary relationship individually, the Commission must make a
factual determination based on the economic realities. This is true even if
parental control is maintained through less than one hundred percent
ownership, since the key is the possibility of competition between the
companies and not the percentage of parental ownership. However, the
Commission may, in the future, adopt a de..minimis rule, stating that if
ownership by the parent is below X percent the Commission will presume
that the enterprises are separate.
The same type of factual economic analysis is necessary to establish
whether, in their dealings with each other, two subsidiaries of the same
parent constitute a single enterprise. In its Kodak26 decision the Commis-
sion decided that the EEC subsidiaries of Kodak made up a single econom-
ic, controlled unit, and hence agreements between the subsidiaries could
not restrict competition within the Common Market. It is possible that in a
future case the Commission will find, that a parent exercised its control
over the subsidiaries in such a manner as to permit them to compete with
each other. Under such conditions, agreements between two controlled
subsidiaries may be held to violate Article 85.
An interesting issue, still to be resolved, involves an EEC subsidiary
found to be controlled by its non-EEC parent: for purposes of the Commis-
sion regulations on the notification of agreements and furnishing in-
formation, does the "single" enterprise "belong to a Member State"? 27 In
2 1MCI-ACHLAN AND SWANN, supra, note 9 at 130.
22JOHN TEMPLE LANG, THE COMMON MARKET AND COMMON LAW, U. of Chicago
Press, Chicago, 1966, p. 385.
23GRAUPNER, supra, note 6 at I .24Herman Schwarz, The Common Market Antitrust Laws and American Business 1965
U. ILL. L. F. 617, p. 627.
2Deringer has steadfastly held this view since 1963: Deringer article in 12 INT'L &
COMp. L.Q. (1963), pp. 587-588; Deringer, Problems of Distribution within the Common
Market 10 ANTITRUST BULL. 105 (1965), p. 113. and supra note 7 at 8-9.2 6CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9378 (June 1i0, 1970).27George Nebolsine, Foreign Enterprises under the Common Market Antitrust Rules, 38
N.Y.U. LAW REV. 479 (1963), p. 481.
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the normal situation without this parent-subsidiary issue, it is clear that
even one hundred percent non-EEC ownership of a Common Market firm
does not affect the Commission's full jurisdiction over the firm, 28 and it
seems likely that the Commission will assert its jurisdiction over the whole
parent-subsidiary complex as well.
In its decision against the American-based Continental Can Co.,29 the
EEC Commission recognized two enterprises in the subsidiaries of Conti-
nental Can, yet held the parent company liable for their conduct:
Continental Can Company, Inc. (Continental), Europemballage Corporation
(Europemballage), and Schmalbach-Lubeca-Werke AG (SLW), companies
doing business directly or indirectly in the Common Market, are enterprises
within the meaning of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty.
Since it is the sole shareholder of Europemballage and holds 85.8 percent of
SLW's capital, Continental controls both of these enterprises. It must there-
fore be held accountable for their conduct.
30
While Continental Can Co. involved the application of Article 86 and was
thus concerned with the abuse of a dominant market position, there seems
little doubt that the Commission will rely on the same theory in the field of
Article 85 to hold parent companies liable for the conduct of their subsi-
diaries even though these subsidiaries were recognized as separate "enter-
prises."
C. Apt to Affect Trade Between the Member States
Unlike the Sherman Act, Article 85(l) is concerned only with restrictive
agreements and practices "which are apt to affect trade between the Mem-
ber States." This pre-requisite is the chief obstacle to the true ex-
tra-territorial application of the EEC anti-trust laws, to activities outside
the Common Market by either EEC or non-EEC firms. However, if trade
between Member States is found to be affected, Article 85(1) applies
without any distinctions being drawn on the ground that the enterprises
involved are EEC or non-EEC companies.
The big debate concerning this clause involved the question whether it
required that trade be adversely affected. By now it has been established
that despite ambiguity in the various official language texts of the
Treaty, trade need not be adversely affected under 85(1). Thus for
Schwarz, "any interference with the 'normal' market forces of supply and
demand is within the scope of Article 85(l)."'3 1 Deringer fully agrees:
281d.
29 CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9481 (December 13, 1971).
3 0 1d., at 9029.
3 1Schwarz in 1965 U. ILL. L. F., p. 629.
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The flow of trade would be hampered, or at least be placed in jeopardy (and
because of the word 'apt' this is sufficient), where a restraint of competition
within the meaning of Article 85(1) changes the intensity or the direction of
the flow of goods, thereby artificially diverting it from its normal, natural
course.
Accordingly, the requirement of an aptness to affect inter-Member-State
trade does not allow for a restraint of competition within the Common
Market to be judged according to whether its effects on economic intercourse
are in any way 'harmful' or 'beneficial'.
32
Graupner3 3 and Honig et al. 34 also share this view. In its Faience
Convention 35 decision, the Commission held that the agreement involved
violated Article 85(l), although it was shown that trade between Member
States in those products actually increased subsequent to the objectionable
restrictive agreement. The lack of the adverse effect requirement became
firmly established by the Court of Justice in Consten and Grundig v. EEC
Commission :36
The plaintiffs claimed ... that the Commission had not shown that, in the
absence of the agreement, interstate trade would have been greater... In the
Court's view the crux of the matter was whether the agreement was liable to
threaten, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, the freedom of trade in
a way which impeded the attainment of a single market. It felt that the
re-export prohibition patently did constitute such an impediment. .. a
Thus, the fact that an agreement favours an increase-even a considerable
one-in the volume of trade between States is not sufficient to exclude the
fact that this agreement might 'affect' such trade...a
In S. A. Cadillon v. Firma Hoss, Maschinenbau KG,39 the Court of Justice
of the EEC held that an agreement is apt to affect trade between Member
States if its legal or factual status leads to an inference "with a sufficient
degree of probability" that the agreement "could, directly or indirectly,
actually or potentially" affect trade between Member States.
The implications of the necessity that "trade between the Member
States" be affected for Article 85(1) to apply,, will be considered at some
length in Section D, pat.
32DERINGER, supra, note 7 at 23.
33GRAUPNER, supra, note 6 at 14.
34 FREDERICK HONIG, WILLIAM J. BROWN, ALFRED GLEISS and MARTIN HIRSCH, CAR-
TEL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Butterworths, London, 1963: pp.
12- 13.3 5CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 7023 (May 1964).
3 6CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 8046 (July 13, 1966).3TMcLACHLAN and SWANN, supra, note 9 at 175.3
aM.R. Mok, The Cartel Policy of the EEC Commission, 1962-1967, 6 COMMON
MARKET L. REV. 67 (1968-9), p. 91.39CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 8135 (May 6, 1971).
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D. Object or Effect of the Prevention, Restriction or Distortion of Com-
petition within the Common Market
The EEC Commission has developed a de-minimis rule under which
restrictive arrangements with only minor effects within the Common Mar-
ket are deemed to be outside the coverage of Article 85(1). The Commis-
sion's Notice on Agreements, Decisions, and Concerted Practices of Mi-
nor Importance Not Coming within Article 85(l) of the Treaty,40 issued on
June 2, 1970, codifies this rule:
The Commission believes that agreements between enterprises engaged in the
manufacture or distribution of goods do not come within the prohibition of
Article 85, paragraph 1, of the EEC Treaty where:
-the products involved, in the part of the Common Market covered by the
Agreement, account for no more than five percent of the turnover in the
same products or products considered to be similar by consumers on the
basis of their properties, utility or price, and
-the total annual turnover of the enterprises that are parties to the agreement
does not exceed 15 million units of account (= $) or, for agreements between
trading enterprises, 20 million units of account.41
The turnover total is calculated for this purpose by combining par-
ent-subsidiary groups into one unit. The Notice emphasizes that the Rome
Treaty applies only to arrangements that have an appreciable effect on
market conditions, and adds that even some agreements falling outside the
standards listed may be held to impair trade between Member States only
slightly and hence not be barred by Article 85(l).
The position of the Commission is in full accord with the prior decisions
of the Court of Justice on this subject. In Socit Technique Miniere v.
Maschinenbau Ulm, 42 the Court laid down the rule that the relevant
market circumstances determine whether an exclusive selling agreement is
prohibited by Article 85(1). In Volk v. Ets. J. Vervaecke S.P.R.L.,43 the
Court held that due to the weak market position of the parties concerned,
an exclusive distributorship contract with an absolute territorial protection
clause did not violate Article 85(1), 4 and reiterated this view in S. A.
Cadillon v. Firma Hoss, Maschinenbau KG. 45 S.A.Brasserie de Haecht v.
Consorts Wilkin-Janssen4 6 stands for the proposition that a requirements
contract does not per se violate Article 85(l), but that the market context,
40CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 2700.
411d., at 1853- 1854.
42CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 8047 (1966).
4aCCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 8074 (July 9, 1969).44The agreement covered washing machines that made up 0.08% of the EEC production
and 0.2% of the total German production, and 0.6% of the sales in the assigned territory that
comprised Belgium and Luxemburg.
45CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 8135 (May 6, 1971).46CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 8053 (December 12, 1967).
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including information concerning the contracts of other sellers in the same
market is determinative.
This rejection of a per-se rule for violations of 85(1), coupled with the
insistence on "appreciable effects" and on a factual, case-by-case determi-
nation based on conditions in the affected relevant market for the product
subject to the restrictive arrangement, in effect constitutes the adoption of
a limited, American-style rule of reason. Thus Joliet, who in 1967 already
showed the desirability of a rule of reason in the enforcement of Article
85(0), aside from the built-in rule of reason found in 85(3), seems to have
been proved right. 47
Aside from possible differences due to the variance in the delineation of
territorial applicability, whatever arrangement "appreciably effects" com-
petition within the Common Market will also necessarily "be apt to affect
trade between Member States," since the latter was defined as an in-
terference with the normal market forces of supply and demand. "It is clear
that the perceptibility of a restriction of competition, by its nature, must
have an effect on the results attained." '48
In fact the Commission in its practice applies the same standard of
"some important effect" to both the "apt-to-affect-trade" and the "ob-
ject-or-effect-the-prevention,-restriction-or-distortion-of-competition" tests
in Article 85(1).49 Language in the recent Court of Justice case, Sirena
S.r.l. v. Eda GmbH,50 adds weight to the practical interchangeability of
these two ideas: "A cartel agreement comes within Article 85, paragraph I,
only where it appreciably impairs trade between Member States and re-
stricts competition within the Common Market.' 51
E. The Territorial Limitation on the
Applicability of Art. 85
Since "within the Common Market" has a broader geographical appli-
cability than the concept "between the Member States," the within dis-
cussion will focus on the latter, narrower term. An agreement that affects
one Member State only is not covered by Article 85, although it may in
fact have sizeable effects within the Common Market, i.e. within that one
State.
4 7 RENt JOLIET, THE RULE OF REASON IN ANTITRUST LAW, Martinus Nijhoff, La Haye,
1967, pp. 115- 116, 184- 185. See also, Warren F. Schwartz and Edward W. Wellman, Jr.,
The Rule of Reason in EEC Antitrust: Efficiency Enhancement Through Integration by
Agreement among Competitors, 12 VIRGINIA J. INT'L L. 192 (1972).
4
1Mok, supra, note 38 at 86.49Deringer in 10 ANTITRUST BULL., pp. 109- 110.
5 0CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 8101 (February 19, 1971).
51id., at 7112.
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Campbell 52 and the CCH Common Market Reporter53 list a series of
decisions by national courts holding that Article 85 does not apply to the
domestic, one-state arrangements that were attacked as violating Article
85. However, a purely intra-state practice may have an appreciable, though
indirect, effect on trade between Member States, e.g., an exclusive dealing
arrangement between all manufacturers and retailers of a product in one
state. 54 In 1969 the EEC Commission decided that the standard sales
conditions imposed by Agfa-Gevaert in Germany only, which banned
ports in order to effectuate a resale price maintenance system valid under
German law, violated Article 85.55
In the S.A.Brasserie de Haecht case,5 6 the European Court of Justice
held that an exclusive purchase contract between a Belgian brewery and a
Belgian tavern owner may violate 85(l), as the few Belgian brewers had
such contracts with a high percentage of the Belgian customers. A more
recent decision of the Court in Braiierei A. Bilger Sohne GmbH v. Hein-
rich and Marta Jehle57 also involved an exclusive purchase contract for
beer, this time in Germany. The Court decided that although Regulation
No. 17 did not require notification of an agreement between enterprises of
only one state involving neither exports nor imports between Member
States, the Commission may find that the agreement is contrary to Article
85(1).
But the exercise of certain rights under national law without any accom-
panying restrictive agreements has been held by the Court of Justice not to
violate 85(l), even though the net result is a reduction of intra-EEC
competition: Parke, Davis and Co. v. Probel,58 on the exercise of national
patent rights; and Sirena S.r.l. v. Eda GmbH,59 on the exercise of national
trademark rights.60
As a general rule, agreements regulating exports by EEC companies to
5 2ALAN CAMPBELL, I COMMON MARKET LAW, Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1969,
p. 161.53CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 2011.70-.75.54McLACHLAN and SWANN, supra, note 9 at 132.55CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 2021.754 (December 30, 1969, Commission
Press Release). For other examples, see Sections 2021.77 and 920 1.56CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 8053 (December 12, 1967).
57CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 8076 (March 18, 1970).
58CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 8054 (February 29, 1968).59CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 8101 (February 18, 1971).
"
0However, in Sirena v. Eda the Court made it clear that the exercise of the trademark
right may violate Article 85 if there are also "agreements between owners of the trademark or
their successors in interest, where such agreements enable them to prevent imports from other
Member States. If the concurrent assignment to several users of a national trademark protect-
ing the same product results in the restoration of impenetrable frontiers between the Member
States, such a practice can impair trade between the States and distort competition in the
Common Market." CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 810 1, p. 7112.
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non-EEC countries, e.g., export cartels, vertical price maintenance on
exports and distributorship obligations for non-EEC markets, will not be
governed by Article 85.61 Thus, the Commission granted a negative clear-
ance [necessarily predicated on a finding that the arrangement did not fall
within Article 85(l)] for an exclusive patent and know-how license by a
French firm, A. Raymond of Grenoble, to the Japanese Nagoya Rubber
Co., for the manufacture and sale in the Far East of plastic fasteners for
automobiles. The negative clearance was given although Nagoya was for-
bidden to export outside the Far East.62 This attitude is similar to the
philosophy behind the American Webb-Pomerene Act in that it shows no
concern for export transactions whose effect is felt only outside the Com-
mon Market.
However, an export cartel may have appreciably adverse effects on
trade between Member States, e.g., "an enterprise located in the EEC may
be forced to raise its prices inside the community, because of its obligations
outside the Common Market as a party to an international cartel. Likewise,
an export cartel may have an influence on the quantity of products avail-
able for sale in the EEC and an exclusive dealing arrangement between an
enterprise of the Common Market, and a foreign corporation may close the
way for other firms, to enter that foreign market."63
While the EEC has not concerned itself with purely export transactions,
it has paid close attention to arrangements affecting imports into the Com-
mon Market, as the latter directly and actually restrict freedom of econom-
ic activity within the Common Market.6 4 'Thus the Commission has
recently stated that national cartels restricting imports or setting resale
prices for imports must register.6 5 Article 85 applies to agreements be-
tween non-EEC firms concerning their importing into the EEC products
manufactured outside the Common Market, as long as their effect is to
restrain producers to consumers within the EEC.66
A division of the EEC import market, among several non-ECC produc-
ers with fixed prices and a ban on re-exports within the Common Market,
is clearly covered by Article 85(l) as trade between Member States is
directly affected.6 7 The negative clearance in Grosfillex-Fillistdorfr has
been viewed as establishing that a ban on imports into the Common
Market may have a sufficiently large, albeit indirect, influence on trade
6 1DERINGER, supra, note.7 at 73.62CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9513 (June 9, 1972).63 Kruithof in 2 COMMON MARKET L. REV., p. 73.641vo E. Schwartz, Proceedings, ABA Conference on Antitrust and the European Com-
munities, September, 1963, pp. 206- 207.
6CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9424 (March 29, 1971).
66 DERINGER, supra, note 7 at 17.67Schwartz, supra, note 24 at 623.68CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 7020 (March 1I, 1964).
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between Member States so that it may violate Article 85(l). 69 In
Grossfillex, the Commission did not consider it decisive that the parties did
not intend to affect intra-EEC trade; thus an unintended effect within the
Common Market may suffice for holding an agreement invalid. 70
"According to the wording of Article 85(l), it suffices if only the person
on whom the restrictions are imposed is in one of the six Member States,
while the person who imposes the restrictions is outside the territory of the
Common Market..."71 The generally accepted test for finding a restriction
of competition is that an enterprise be limited by agreement or concerted
practice "in its freedom with regard to competitive behavior (internal
effect) and that (b) as a result competition on the market is hampered
because consumers, suppliers or competitors are limited in their choice
(external effect)." 72 In Beguelin Import Co. v. G.L.Import Export Co. 73
the Court of Justice established that an exclusive sales agreement between
a producer outside the EEC and a distributor within an EEC country is
covered by Article 85 if the distributor is prevented from reexporting to
other EEC states or can exclude parallel imports of that product from other
EEC countries into the protected territory.
It is still unsettled whether the appointment by a non-E.E.C. producer of
one exclusive distributor for the whole Common Market, coupled with a
ban on re-exports outside the E.E.C., could ever be contrary to Article
85(l). Ebb, basing his argument on Grosfil/ex, reasons that 85(l) should
apply if there is "demonstrable impact on trade and competition within the
Common Market," through the arrangement providing absolute territorial
protection.74 In another article Ebb cites the impact such an arrangement
by the American Baye-Co. would have:
Nevertheless, the substantial distortion in the flow of imports into the Com-
mon Market and (derivatively) among its constituent members caused by
American. Bayer's grant of absolute territorial protection to that Market, as
well as by the outsider's imposition of a ban on exports from the Common
Market to third country areas, would have a far greater potential for dis-
torting competition among the Member States than could be foreseen in the
Grosfillex negative clearance case... An international cartel agreement of the
type involved in Bayer could be shown to affect trade and competition within
the Common Market, and article 85(l) could accordingly be deemed appli-
cable.75
69Carl H. Fulda, The First Antitrust Decisions of the Commission of the European
Economic Community, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 625 (1965), pp. 626-627. Deringer in 10 ANTI-
TRUST BULL., p. 119.70Schwartz, supra, note 24_at 624-625.
71
HONIG et al., supra note 34 at 14.72DERINGER, supra, note 7 at 35.73CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 8149 (November 25, 1971).74Lawrence F. Ebb, The Grundig-Costen Case Revisited: Judicial Harmonization of
National Law and Treaty Law in the Common Market, 115 U. PENN. L. REV. 855 (1967), pp.
887-888.75Lawrence F. Ebb, Common Market Anticartel Law and Trademark and Patent License
Agreements, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 545 (1969), pp. 589-590.
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It would not be surprising if EEC supervision of import cartels became
more vigorous in the near future and extended to all arrangements having
appreciable effects, directly or indirectly, within the Common Market. As
far as export cartels are concerned, it definitely will not remain true that
the Commission does not move against such agreements restricting exports
to non-member countries even when they have important consequences
within the EEC. 76
F. The Exemption Under Article 85(3)
Under Article 85(3) the Commission may declare, if the four listed
conditions are met, that although an agreement violates 85(l) it shall be
exempt from the prohibitions of Article 85. According to EEC Commis-
sioner Schumacher, Article 85(3) "is designed to fulfill the function of a
rule of reason. The application of paragraph (3) generally depends on prior
notification, and enterprises engaging in restrictive practices therefore can-
not wait to see what will happen. If they wish to invoke arguments showing
that their agreement is reasonable, they will have to notify." 77
Other writers claim that 85(3) is not really a legislative rule of reason,
because "under article 85(3) the decision is not that the agreement falls
outside the 'prohibited' category, but rather that despite its prohibited
character the agreement or practice will be tolerated so long as those
beneficial purposes are served."178 Zaphiriou holds that the "appreciable
effects" test of 85( l) is the rule of reason, while 85(3) is broader in scope:
Under Article 85(l) and (2) the object of the inquiry is to determine the
degree of interference with competition, under Article 85(3) to determine the
degree of ultimate consumer benefit. The scope of investigation under Article
85(3) is therefore much wider than would be justified under the rule of
reason. 79
The better view seems to be that 85(l) and (3) are complementary; the
"appreciable effects" test of 85(1), and the exemptions under 85(3) togeth-
er, serve the same role as the American rule of reason.
The four pre-requisites listed in Article 85(3) severely limit the ex-
emptive discretion of the Commission: "it must be emphasized that the
Commission may not grant any exemption, whether 'individual' or 'block'
unless the strict requirements of the Article 85(3) straight-jacket are satis-
76Fred S. Scheuermann, Common Market and Uncommon Prices?, 5 J. WORLD TRADE
L. 533 (197 1 ), p. 534, describes the situation as it currently exists.77H. Schumacher, The System of Enftrcement: The European Economic Community,
pp. 65-77, in Supplementary Publication No. 6, INT'L. & Cosp. L.Q. Stevens & Sons Ltd.,
London, 1963, p. 69.
78Note in 17 STAN. L. REV., p. 269.79G. A. Zaphiriou, Rule of Reason and Double Jeopardy in European Antitrust Law, 6
TEx. INT'L. L. F. 1 (1970), p. 6.
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fled." 80 The denial of an 85(3) exemption must be based on a factual
evaluation of market conditions, and must be accompanied by clear rea-
sons, or else the Court of Justice will void the decision of the Commis-
sion.81
If an agreement is properly notified to the Commission according to
Regulation No. 17/62,82 it must be considered as valid until the Commis-
sion makes a finding that the agreement violates Article 85(l) and does not
qualify for an 85(3) exemption.8 3 Under Regulation No. 19/6584 the Com-
mission may grant an 85(3) exemption to groups of agreements and con-
certed practices, and this authorization was upheld by the European Court
of Justice.85 Regulation No. 67/6786 granted such a group exemption to
exclusive distributorship agreements containing only the provisions listed
in Regulation 67/67, and established that the group exemption eliminated
the requirement to notify the Commission of the agreements covered by
the group exemption.8 7
Chapter II. The Extraterritorial Application
of Article 85 in Practice
A. Activities of non-EEC firms within the Common Market
The main aim of this survey is to show that the Commission and the
Court of Justice have, in their practice, generally considered the same
conduct as violating Article 85 whether or not the parties were EEC
companies. Thus the same test of safeguarding the Common Market was
always applied, and there was no pattern of discrimination for or against
non-EEC firms. The ensuing list of cases does not purport to be
all-inclusive, but it conveys the spirit of anti-trust law enforcement by the
EEC authorities against non-member state firms.
Within the last few years EEC enforcement of Article 85 has become
more forceful overall. Thus it was fairly recently that the EEC for the first
time imposed fines for violations of Article 85, 88and for noncompliance
8 CAMPBELL, I COMMON MARKET L., p. 160.
81S.A. Cimenteries C.B.R. Cementsbedrijven N.V. v. Commission of EEC, March 15,
1967. CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 8052.82CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 2651; Regulation 17/62 governs the filing of
applications and notifications with the Commission to comply with the EEC antitrust laws.83Court of Justice decision in S.A. Portelange v. S.A. Smith Corona Marchant In-
ternational, July 9, 1969. CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 8075.
84CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 2717.
85ltaly v. EEC Council and Commission, July 13, 1966. CCH COMMON MARKET REP.,
Section 8048.86CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 2727 (March 22, 1967).87Richard M. Buxbaum, The Group Exemption and Exclusive Distributorships in the
Common'Market-Procedtiral Technicalities, 14 ANTITRUST BULL. 499 (1969), pp. 507-508.
"
8The International Quinine Cartel and Dyestuff cases which saw the first imposition of
fines will be discussed in some detail at Chapter II.A.2. hereunder.
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with a Commission request for information during an investigation.8 9
Recently, the Commission has moved against 22 sugar refiners, 90 evidenc-
ing its determination vigorously to enforce Article 85.
I. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 85 TO NON-EEC FIRMS IN
COMMISSION AND COURT OF JUSTICE DECISIONS
Grosfillex-Fillistdorf,"91 Commission decision, March 11, 1964: negative
clearance granted where a French plastics producer gave the exclusive Swiss
distributorship to a Swiss firm. The Swiss company agreed not to handle
competitive products and not to re-export into the Common Market. The
Commission held competition within the Common Market would not be
"perceptibly' affected since re-import into the EEC was unlikely as the
product would be subjected to first Swiss and then EEC import tariffs.
Further, there were numerous competing producers within the Common
Market producing similar goods.
Bendix-Martens et Straet;92 Commission decision, June I, 1964: negative
clearance provided for a non-exclusive distributorship agreement for brakes
and accessories between the American manufacturer Bendix and the Belgian
distributor Martens et Straet.
SA.Nicholas Freres-Vitapro; 93 Commission decision, June 30, 1964:
negative clearance given to the partial sale of its assets by the French firm
Nicholas Freres to a British company, Vitapro, for exploitation outside the
Common Market. The British purchaser was under the contract barred from
making or selling hairdressing products with the EEC for five years, and
indefinitely from using the assigned trademark within the EEC. The arrange-
ment was approved as the EEC market in hairdressing products is highly
competitive and Nicholas was not one of the largest EEC producers.
Harbison-Walker Refractories Co.-Basref N.V.;94 Commission decision,
February 15, 1967: negative clearance granted to an exclusive 15-year li-
cense for Holland of the American firm's technical know-how, because the
Commission found that most sales by the Dutch licensee were made outside
Holland.
Eurogypsum; 95 Commission decision, February 26, 1968: negative clear-
ance for European-wide organization set up for joint research to develop the
plaster and gypsum industry, without any restrictions on competition among
the member firms. EUROGYPSUM has member firms in 16 countries,
including 5 EEC states.
Parke, Davis and Co. v. Probel;96 Court of Justice decision, February 29,
1968: the Court held that the exercise of patent rights created by the law of a
89S.A. Raffinerie Tirlemontoise case in which the Belgian firm was fined $4000 by the
Commission, for failure to submit documents requested for an investigation of the EEC sugar
industry. CCH Common Market Reporter, Section 9457 (September 16, 1971, Press Release
by the Commission).
9
°"Antitrust Officials of EEC Accuse 22 Sugar Reliners," New York Times, July 25,
1972, p. 51.
9 1CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 7020 (March II, 1964).9 2CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 7024 (June 1, 1964).
93CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 7025 (July 30, 1964).9 4CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9155 (February 15, 1967).
95CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9220 (February 26, 1968).96CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 8054 (February 29, 1968).
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Member State did not by itself violate Article 85(). Although the Court only
decided this narrow point of law, the outcome was essential for protecting the
rights of the American company. The factual background was that Parke,
Davis and Co. held a Dutch patent on the process of making chloramphenicol
and licensed its use to a Dutch firm. In Italy processes for making drugs are
not patentable and an Italian producer used the process developed by Parke,
Davis. When some of the Italian products reached the Dutch market, the
licensee wanted to exercise his right under Dutch patent law to bar such
imports from Italy.
Scott Paper Co.;9 7 Commission decision, October 24, 1968: will grant 85
(3) exemption for trademark and know-how licenses on paper products issued
by the Scott Paper Co. of Philadelphia to its fully owned Belgian and 50%
owned Italian subsidiaries. While the licenses were not exclusive according to
their terms, their territorial scope was limited strictly and in fact the Ameri-
can firm granted no other licenses for these territories. Although there was
thus only one licensee in the Benelux and Italy, the exemption applied
because these licensees agreed not to prevent the importation into their
territories of Scott products made by other Scott licensees elsewhere.
Remington Rand Italia; 98 Commission press release, June II, 1969: the
American Sperry Rand Corp. granted its Italian trademarks on electric sha-
vers to its Italian subsidiary. Following Commission intervention, the firms
'agreed to desist from using the trademark rights to prevent parallel imports
of electric shavers legitimately bearing an authentic 'Remington' trademark.
(Query how much force this position of the Commission has following Sirena
v. Eda99)
Christiani & Nielsen; 100 Commission decision, June 18, 1969: negative
clearance for agreement between a Danish parent and a wholly-owned Dutch
subsidiary as the two firms were held to constitute a single enterprise whose
parts could not be expected to compete with each other even in the absence
of this express agreement not to compete.
S.A. Portelange v. S.A. Smith Corona Marchant International;'01 Court of
Justice decision, July 9, 1969: the Court established that an arrangement
notified to the Commission under Regulation No. 17 remains provisionally
valid until the Commission makes a specific finding that the agreement vi-
olates Article 85. The underlying case concerned an exclusive distributorship
contract given by a Swiss firm to a Belgian company which extended over
Belgium and Luxembourg.
Kodak Subsidiaries;10 2 Commission decision, June 30, 1970: negative
clearance for the standardized general sales conditions imposed by the EEC
national subsidiaries of the American Eastman Kodak Co., following a finding
that the whole Kodak group constituted one enterprise. The approved dis-
tribution scheme was limited to dealers meeting certain professional stan-
dards for qualifying, but the Commission considered this restriction justified,
in order to insure good post-sale servicing, maintenance of quality and promo-
tion of the trademark. However, the acceptance of the scheme was' obtained
97CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9263 (October 24, 1968).
9 8CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9307 (June I1, 1969).
99CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 8101 (February 18, 1971, decision by the Court
of Justice).
"'0CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9308 (June 18, 1969).
"°'CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 8075 (July 9, 1969).
1
0 2 CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9378 (June 30, 1970).
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only after the elimination of those clauses from the general sales contract that
had effectively prevented re-exports within the Common Market.
Omega; 0 3 Commission decision, October 28, 1970: 85(3) exemption
granted for EEC distribution system of the Swiss watch manufacturer Ome-
ga. Omega established objective conditions for qualifying as a distributor and
limited the number of authorized retailers. The Commission accepted this
restriction on EEC competition as it still permitted a good distribution of
Omega watches while assuring a profitable volume to the dealers. A re-export
ban within the Common Market had to be abandoned, but Omega dealers are
still restricted to selling to other authorized dealers and to private customers
within the EEC.
White Horse Distillers Ltd.; 04 Commission decision, February 2, 1971:
the Commission announced that it will approve an exclusive distributorship
agreement between the British whiskey producer and a French firm for most
of France, although the French distributor agreed "not to try to sell" outside
its assigned territory. On the same day the Commission publicized that it
planned to accept a standard contract between the English Distillers Co. and
various EEC ship suppliers, which prevented resale except for duty-free
consumption.
Commission decisions of October 9, 1971;1 5 on this date the Commission
announced that 3 international agreements would be upheld.
Burroughs Corp. of Detroit:'0r Commission decision, December 22, 197 1:
negative clearance for patent and know-how licensing agreements on the
manufacturer of plasticized carbon paper between Burroughs and a German
firm for Germany and a French firm for France.
SPAR: 10 7 Commission announced on April II, 1972, that a negative clear-
ance would be forthcoming for the by-laws and contract of the international
foodstuffs distributing organization SPAR. SPAR is composed of 14 national
organizations, with 5 of the countries being EEC Member States.
Davidson Rubber Co., of Charlestown, Mass.:x0 8 Commission decision,
June 9, 1972: 85(3) exemption for exclusive patent licensing contracts by
Davidson Rubber for the manufacture of automobile armrests with German,
French and Italian companies in their respective countries.
2. THE QUININE CARTEL AND DYESTUFF MANUFACTURERS DECI-
SIONS
In its July 16, 1969, International Quinine Cartel decision,10 9 the Com-
mission imposed for the first time fines"10 on EEC firms for violation of
I°3CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9396 (October 28, 1970).
104CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9413 (February 2, 197 1).
105CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9414 (February 2, 1971).
106CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9485 and 9486, (December 22, 197 1).
107 CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9505 (April II, 1972).
108 CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9512 (June 9, 1972).
109CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9313 (July 16, 1969).
"°Under Regulation No. 17/62 an enterprise may be fined between $1000 and $ 1 million
or 10% of its annual turnover for wilfull or negligent violation of Articles 85 or 86; between
$50 and $1000 per day for noncompliance with a Commission order to cease and desist from
partaking in an illegal arrangement: and between $100 and $5000 for filing false or misleading,
incomplete information with the Commission, or for refusing to submit to an investigation. See
CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Sections 2542, 2551 and 2552.
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Article 85 by gentlemen's agreements on prices, production controls and
marketing quotas within the Common Market. In 1960 all European quin-
ine producers signed overt contracts setting export prices and quotas for
their non-EEC trade. "Two days after the agreements were signed, two
gentlemen's agreements were reduced to writing, but purposely not signed.
These gentlemen's agreements extended the effect of the signed agree-
ments into the EEC states...::"I"
Since the Commission was not notified of the gentlemen's agreements,
the issue of a possible 85(3) exemption never arose." 2 On July 15, 1970,
the Court of Justice upheld the Commission in three related decisions,113
although the Court slightly reduced the fines. In these decisions the Court
made some important determinations: a gentlemen's agreement expressing
the parties' common intent may be contrary to Article 85; a Commission
decision imposing fines must be accompanied by reasons revealing the
factual and legal bases for the fines, and may be published by the Commis-
sion; fines may be levied for past as well as for present conduct, and even if
the violations had already ceased prior to the Commission's intervention;
and in setting the amount of the fine "account must be taken of the nature
of the restriction on competition, the number and size of the enterprises
involved, the respective share of the market that they control in the
Community, and the market situation at the time the violation was com-
mitted.'"' 4
The Court also held that "(a) fine imposed by a foreign (= non-EEC)
jurisdiction for the same set of facts cannot be used to offset a fine for a
restriction of competition occurring within the Community,""15 and that
the Commission hence acted properly when, in fining the German Boehri-
nger Mannheim GmbH, it disregarded the fact that the firm had already
been fined $80,000 for anti-trust violations by a United States court.",
On July 24, 1969, the Commission fined ten Dyestuff Manufacturers 1 7
for their concerted Practices in the recurrently simultaneous and equal
"'lCase Note on International Quinine Cartel and Dyestuff, 3 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. &
POL. 174 (1970), p. 176.
112 Failure to properly notify the Commission prevents a negative clearance for 85(l), an
exemption under 85(3), and the provisional validity of the arrangement pending a decision by
the Commission, but has no bearing on whether or not an agreement or concerted practice in
fact violates Article 85(l). See CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Sections 2442.01 and .03.
113ACF Chemiefarma N.V. v. Commission of EEC, CCH COMMON MARKET REP.,
Section 8083; Buchler and Co. v. Commission of EEC, CCH COMMON MARKET REP.,
Section 8084: Boehringer Mannheim GmbH v. Commission of EEC, COMMON MARKET
REP., Section 8085.
114ACF Chemifarma N.V., CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 8083, p. 8177.
t15Boehringer Mannheim GmbH, CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 8085, p. 8222.
1161d.117CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9314.
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increases of their sales prices within the Common Market. 118 The com-
panies fined included three Swiss firms, Ciba, Geigy and Sandoz, and one
British firm, Imperial Chemical Industries. Trade between Member States
was impaired because the uniform pricing for each EEC country covered
all imports into the EEC by the fined producers and their distributor
subsidiaries, and served to eliminate intra-Common Market trade. Since
the ten producers fully controlled and directed their sales subsidiaries, the
fines were levied only against the producers. The Commission asserted that
it had jurisdiction also over the non-Member State producing enterprises:
Under Article 85, paragraph I, of the Treaty establishing the EEC, all
agreements between enterprises... and all concerted practices that are ca-
pable of affecting trade between Member States and whose object or effect is
to prevent, restrict, or distort competition within the Common Market, are
incompatible with the Common Market and prohibited. The rules of com-
petition of the Treaty are therefore applicable to all restrictions of com-
petition that produce within the Common Market effects to which Article 85,
paragraph I, applies. There is therefore no need to examine whether the
enterprises that originated such restraints of competition have their head
office within or outside the Community." 19
Thus the jurisdictional claim of the Commission extends to conduct by
non-EEC firms outside the Common Market which has a trade restrictive
effect within the Common Market, and is arguably even broader than the
American claim in Alcoa 120 over conduct by foreigners abroad, which is
intended to and does restrain American commerce. The Commission
stressed that the defendants restrained competition within the EEC "quite
substantially"; it did not consider whether an insubstantial intra-EEC effect
(which may still amount to an "appreciable effect") of a foreigner's conduct
abroad was covered by Article 85, or whether foreign defendants must
have some jurisdictional base within the Common Market in the form of a
branch or subsidiary, since all the foreign defendants in the Dyestuff case
had EEC subsidiaries and representatives. 12 '
Perhaps, since this was the first instance of enforcement against
non-EEC enterprises, the Commission should only have issued cease and
desist orders to all ten manufacturers. 22 Alternatively, the Commission
""The following facts were held to prove the existence of the concerted practice: great
proximity in timing of the price increases: striking similarity of language in the orders to
branches and subsidiaries to raise prices; the increases always affected categories of dyes
which were the same for all producers, and the pricing system worked out to equal prices by
all the manufacturers for each national market. Note in 3 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL., p. 18 1.
1 19Dyestuff Manufacturers, CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9314, pp. 8693-8694.
120148 E.2d 416 (2d Circuit, 1945).
12Markert. supra, note 20 at 896- 897.12 20f course the Commission would not want to show favoritism toward the foreign firms,
by only issuing cease and desist orders as to them while heavily fining the EEC firms involved
in the same practices.
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could have avoided the extraterritorial enforcement issue completely, by
attacking directly the price-fixing acts of the EEC subsidiaries of the
non-EEC producers. Clearly, even a wholly foreign-owned EEC company
is subject to EEC regulation just like any other Member State firm.' 23 If
the subsidiaries claimed lack of economic independence due to parental
control, then the resultant single enterprise undeniably was actively en-
gaged in business within the EEC, so that the EEC authorities would have
jurisdiction over the whole group. The dyestuff manufacturers affected
appealed to the Court of Justice which upheld the fines imposed by the
Commission on all ten firms, including the fines levied on the companies
from outside the EEC. 124
Britain has challenged the jurisdiction of the Commission to fine
non-EEC firms "in the form of a communication from London to the effect
that while taking no stand on the merits of the case, the British Govern-
ment is concerned over its international law aspects, and the failure to
distinguish between the parent organizations and their EEC subsi-
diaries.' 1 25 While Britian did not officially join in the appeal by I.C.I. to the
Court of Justice, a memorandum by the Government containing its views
"on the so-called extra-territorial application of the rules of competition"
was submitted to the Court. 126
The Commission's response is that the foreign firms in the Dyestuff case
acted within the Community, by giving binding instructions to their EEC
subsidiaries and representatives. 127 British opposition is surprising in light
of the 1956 English Restrictive Trade Practices Act, which applies to all
persons "carrying on business within the United Kingdom. Whether these
persons (or companies) are resident within the United Kingdom or outside
of it, is of no importance. .."128 However, British practice insists that to be
covered "the foreign company must have substantial visible commercial
activity on British soil," and generally accepts the legal separateness of
parents and subsidiaries without piercing the corporate veil. 129
If one of the fined firms had been American, the U.S. would be in a very
weak position to object since it has traditionally been the country most
vigorous in the extraterritorial application of its antitrust laws.130 In his
'23Nebolsine supra, note 27 at 48 I.
124CCH COMMON MARKET REP., No. 191, July 19, 1972.
125CCH COMMON MARKET REP., "Euromarket News," December 2, 1969, p. I.126 CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9397 (November 18, 1970, Commission re-
sponse to a written question), p. 8873.
1271d., at 8874.
128Deringer in 12 INT'L. & COMp. L. Q.,p. 583.
129 Kruithof in 2 COMMON MARKET L. REV., p. 84.1
a°See, e.g., JAMES A."RAHL, ed., COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST: OVER-
LAP AND CONFLICT, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1970, pp. 50-89, and Note, Extraterritorial
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Alcoa decision l l Judge Learned Hand asserted American antitrust juris-
diction over a cartel made abroad and including no U.S. participants,
because the agreement was intended to and did restrain American trade.
The case marked the first time that U.S. jurisdiction was based solely on
effects within the U.S., with no acts being committed on U.S. territory and
without participation of any American party in -the attacked arrange-
ment.13 2
B. Application to Activities of EEC Firms
Outside the Common Market
Since Article 85 is only concerned with restrictions of competition
within the Common Market, "arrangements with firms outside the Com-
mon Market, or between firms inside but aimed solely at transactions
outside the Market, are likely to be exempt. Only a showing of repercus-
sions inside the Market would alter the result."' 33
The Commission has displayed no urge to find that arrangements by
EEC firms concerning their conduct outside the Common Market had
appreciably restrictive effects on competition within the Community. A
written agreement setting export prices and quotas to non-EEC countries
was not even examined as to its intra-EEC effects in the Quinine Cartel
case.13 4 In Grosfillex,13 5 negative clearance was given to an exclusive
distributorship in Switzerland, even though the Swiss distributor agreed not
to sell outside his territory, not to handle competitive products, and not to
re-export into the EEC.
In Dutch Engineers and Contractors Associationl3 6 an agreement call-
ing for cooperation and pooling in large construction contracts to be per-
formed outside the Common Market was approved by the Commission.
The accepted, revised distribution schemes in Kodak 13 7 Omega' 38 and
Application of Federal Antitrust Laws: Delimiting the Reach of Substantive Law under the
Sherman Act, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1030 (1967). Other U.S. legislation is applied ex-
tra-territorially to U.S. persons controlling foreign subsidiaries: see Eckard Rehbinder, The
Foreign Direct Investment Regulations: A European Legal Point of View, 34 L. & CONTEMP.
PROB. 95 (1969), and William Craig, Application of the Trading with the Enemy Act to
Foreign Corporations Owned by Americans: Reflections of Fruehauf v. Massardy, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 579 (1970).
131148 E.2d 416 (2d Circuit, 1945).
13 2 RAHL, ed., COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANrITRUST, p. 382.33Fulda supra, note 69 at 642-643.134The written agreement involved Dutch, German, French and British firms, and set
export prices and quotas for non-EEC markets. The EEC authorities were only concerned
with the extension of this written arrangement by gentlemen's agreements to the EEC
markets. ACF Chemiefarma N. V., CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 8083, pp.
8178-8180.13 5CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 7020.
13 6CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 7030 (October 22, 1964).3 7CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9378.138CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9396.
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N.V.Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken'3 9 all preserved a ban on re-exports
outside the Common Market; it was assumed that the double customs
duties made re-imports into the Common Market unlikely even if no
restrictions were placed on exports outside the EEC, so that the ban on
exports outside the EEC did not affect trade within the Common Market.
But if this is true, why did Philips, Kodak and Omega insist on retaining
the meaningless clause banning exports outside the EEC?
A licensing agreement, whereby the French partnership A. Raymond
gave a patent, know-how and trademark license to the Japanese Nagoya
Rubber Co.140 on fasteners used in the auto industry received Commission
approval, although the Japanese firm was restricted to producing in Japan
and selling in the Far East. In Rieckermann-AEG Elotherm14' exclusive
distributor agreements for Japan and Korea between two German firms
were given negative clearance despite an express clause, prohibiting the
distributor from selling the German-made heating and melting equipment
outside of Japan and Korea.
National agreements on controlling fertilizer exports were upheld by the
Commission, once bans on exports by association member firms to other
EEC countries were removed, but bans on such exports to non-EEC states
could be retained.' 42 Finally in CIMFRANCE 43 the Commission accept-
ed an agreement among French cement producers setting uniform export
prices and export quotas for the members once the agreement was so
revised as not to apply to trade between Member States.
Thus one may fairly conclude that there has been little attempt at true
extra-territorial enforcement of Article 85, i.e., against activities by EEC
firms outside the Common Market. The Commission has only limited
jurisdiction in this area since "trade between the Member States" must be
affected and an effect on the foreign commerce of a Member State does not
suffice.
The writer would like to end the discussion of Article 85 by raising the
question whether the Quinine Cartel and the Dyestuff cases portend a
stronger enforcement of Article 85, or "would the Commission have taken
its two major decisions imposing fines on firms which were parties to
agreements in the markets for quinine and dyestuffs, if it had not been put
139CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9294 (March 6, 1969, Press Release by the
Commission).
140CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9513 (June 9, 1972).141CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9267 (November 6, 1968).
142 CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9315 (July 15, 1969, for Italy), Section 9408
(December 23, 1970, for France).143CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9475 (November 6, 1971, Press Release by the
Commission).
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on the spot by the U.S. Dept. of Justice in the first case and the German
Bundeskartellamt in the second?"1 44
Chapter III. Article 86:
Ban on Abuses of a Dominant Position
A. The scope of applicability
Article 86 prohibits "any abusive exploitation by one or more enter-
prises of a dominant position within the Common Market."
Article 86 of the Rome Treaty is directed against the evils which are general-
ly said to flow from monopoly rather than against monopoly itself: the fixing
of unreasonably high prices, the limitation of Supply in order to exact higher
prices, the refusal as a deliberate policy to introduce technological improve-
ments or innovations. 145
The approach taken by Article 86 is based upon an attitude of neutrality
toward the existence of market dominant positions. It does not try to break
up monopolistic positions, but instead, is confined to supervising the conduct
and performance of dominant firms. Remedies are thus behavioral rather than
structural. In cases of abuses, the enforcement agency could go as far as to
set the prices at which dominant firms can sell or fix the quantities which they
must produce. 146
Article 86 covers market domination by several enterprises when there
is no competition between them due to a legal or factual, economic rela-
tionship. "Where several enterprises are consolidated in a combine, appli-
cation of Article 86, in contrast to Article 85(l), does not depend upon
whether, notwithstanding their legal independence, they may be considered
to be one or several enterprises from an economic point of view."' 1 47 Joliet
writes in the same vein, that "Article 86 could reach dominant positions
based on overt collusive agreements within the meaning of Article 85, as
well as groups of enterprises which constitute legally distinct entities but
which are subject to a unified economic control and also certain oligopoly
situations. "1 48
There is general agreement that a non-EEC company may hold a domi-
nant position within the Common Market, and hence be subject to Article
86 when it abuses that dominant position.14 9 Likewise, an enterprise lo-
cated and producing in only one Member State may dominate a substantial
part of the Common Market. 150 The relevant market for establishing the
144T. 0. Moss, The European Community Still Has No Competition Policy, 16 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 443 (197 1), p. 447.
145REN JOLIET, MONOPOLIZATION AND ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION, Martinus
Nijhoff, La Haye, 1970, p. 9.
1461d. at 127- 128.
14 7DERINGER, supra, note 7 at 172.
148JOLIET, supra, note 145 at 237.
l 49 LANG, THE COMMON MARKET AND COMMON LAW, pp. 424-425. DERINGER, THE
COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, p. 172. HONIG et al. CARTEL
LAW OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, p. 36.
150 HONIG et al, supra, note 34 at 37.
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existence of a dominant position is not the place of production, but the
place where the goods or services are furnished to the users or con-
sumers.
151
Even if the sales or services area dominated by an enterprise only
encompasses one Member State, the Commission has held that one EEC
state may constitute "a substantial part of the Common Market."' 52 No
separate rule of reason applies to Article 86, since by definition any abuse
of a dominant position must be of a magnitude to warrant its prohibition, 153
and there is also no provision for possible exemptions.
The Commission has adopted no comprehensive regulations for applying
Article 86, and its application on an ad hoc basis has until very recently
been non-existent. Therefore, both theoretical and practical standards for
the jurisdictional elements of "dominant position," its "abusive ex-
ploitation," and its "effect upon trade within the Common Market or within
a substantial part of it" are lacking. EEC policy favors mergers and has
shown little concern as to whether or not the merger will create a dominant
position within the EEC for some product. 154
The European Court of Justice has intimated that no abuse will be
automatically assumed from the existence of a dominant position. In Parke,
Davis and Co.155 the exercise of patent rights, in Sirena v. Eda 56 the
exercise of trademark rights, and in Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft
mbH15 7 the exercise of a right akin to copyright, were all held by the Court
not necessarily to constitute such abuses even though great price
differentials were thus brought about between national markets, through
the power under the national laws to exclude others from importing the
patented, trademarked or copyrighted goods.
Prior to the case of Europemballage, the Continental Can subsidiary,
there was only one instance in which the Commission found a violation of
Article 86. That case involved GEMA,' 58 a German company holding
musical copyrights in Germany, and having a turnover of DM 150 million
annually, and the firm was held to have abused its dominant position in
Germany by restricting the economic freedom of composers, authors and
musicians there:
151DERINGER, supra, note 7 at 172.
1521n its decision against GEMA, CCH Common Market Reporter, Section 9438 (June 2,
1971).
153Zaphiriou, supra, note 79 at 9.
154See, e.g., MCLACHLAN and SWANN, COMPETITION POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITY, and Kurt E. Markert, Antitrust Aspects of Mergers in the EEC, 5 TEX. INT. L. F. 32
(1969).
155CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 8054 (February 29, 1968).156CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 8101 (February 18, 197 1).157CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 8106 (June 8, 197 1).15 8CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9438 (June 2, 1971).
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GEMA holds a dominant position in the Federal Republic of Germany,
which is a substantial part of the Common Market; in fact it has no com-
petitors there. GEMA abuses this dominant position in that it
-discriminates against nationals of other Member States,
-imposes obligations on its members in a manner that is not essential,
-prevents, through its system, the realization of a single market for the
services of music publishers,
-extends the copyright, by contract, to non-protected works,
-discriminates against independent importers of records as compared to
record producers, and
-discriminates against importers of tape recorders and video recorders as
compared to German producers of such equipment. 159
The fact that GEMA requires the copyrights for all types of copyrighted
works and for the entire world to be transferred to it is in principle abusive.
Gema's defense of this practice is without basis... The objections against
GEMA directly concern its abusive efforts to extend its dominant position
into an absolute monopoly by means of several provisions of the transfer
agreement... 160
The cited provisions of the by-laws, the distribution plan, the transfer agree-
ment, and the by-laws of the Social Fund make membership in copyright
companies in other States difficult and prevent the realization of a single
market for the services of music publishers in the Community... 161
GEMA was given six months to effectuate the required changes, in
order to comply with the Commission's order. It is noteworthy that activity
essentially within one Member State was considered "a substantial part of
the Common Market," and that the attempt to extend an existing dominant
position was held an abuse.
It seems that now the Commission will become more forceful in moving
against abuses of dominant position, by established monopolies and oli-
gopolistic firms acting in concert, and possibly now some of the bitter
criticism of EEC inactivity in this sphere162 may be stilled.
3. The Commission has every intention of preventing any abusive ex-
ploitation of dominant positions within the Common Market. Subject to a
contrary interpretation by the Court of Justice, the Commission also applies
Article 86 of the EEC Treaty to concentrations of enterprises holding a
dominant position where they are detrimental to the consumers.163
B. The Merger Policy of the EEC and Europemballage
Commissioner von der Groeben has summarized the competition policy
of the Common Market as follows:
First it must remove artificial obstacles to mergers that are economically
desirable within the Common Market, and thus ensure that Common Market
1591d., at 8951-8.
1601d., at 8951-9.
161CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9438, p. 8951- 13.
162See, e.g., Moss in 16 ANTITRUST BULL., pp. 446-4.47.
163CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Sec. 9507 (May, 1972, Information Memo from the
Commission on the Commission's Special Report on Competition Policy), p. 9118.
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firms can compete on world markets. Secondly, it must try to eliminate
artificial distortions of competition between large firms and medium-size and
small firms. Thirdly, it must ensure that competition 'remains effective.
16 4
These aims are also expressed by Commission notices favoring concentra-
tions 165 and cooperation between small- to medium-sized enterprises 166
within the EEC. The Commission favors mergers to help Member-State
firms adjust to the Common Market, and to improve their competitiveness
with large non-EEC enterprises, and to facilitate the integration of the
national markets.167
The Memorandum on Concentration of Firms 168 states the Commis-
sion's view that while Article 85 did not apply to mergers, in rare cases
Article 86 did: "Indeed, the conditions under which a merger would be
prohibited by Article 86 are extremely narrow. Not only must the 'active'
enterprise already have a dominant position, but the merger must also lead
to a 'monopolistic situation' or even to 'complete elimination of com-
petition'. ' 16 9 Article 86, directed only against abuse of an already existing
dominant position, is a weak instrument for controlling mergers. The Com-
mission's abnegation of reliance on Article 85 to control mergers has been
severely criticized by some commentators. 170
While mergers and acquistions have generally disturbed Common Mar-
ket authorities very little, American acquisitions of EEC companies have
alarmed the Common Market.17' The following remarks reveal the concern
within the EEC:
l64Von der Groeben in 10 ANTITRUST BULL., pp. 922-923.
16Memorandum on Concentration for Firms in the Common Market, CCH COMMON
MARKET REP., Section 908 1. A detailed discussion of the Memorandum may be found in, H.
W. de Jong. "Concentration in the Common Market: A Comment on a Memorandum of the
EEC Commission," 4 COMMON MARKET REV. 166 (1966-7).166Notice Concerning Agreements, Decisions and Concerted Practices in Co-operation
between Enterprises. CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 2699 (July 29, 1968). The
Notice states that "(t)he Commission welcomes cooperation among small and medium-sized
enterprises where such corporation enables them to work more rationally and increase their
productivity and competitiveness on a larger market... However, cooperation among large
enterprises, too, can be economically justifiable without presenting difficulties from the angle
of competition policy." For Commission decisions approving agreements to cooperate, sec.
CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9188 for the Transocean Marine Paint Association,
Section 9249 for Alliance de Constructeur Francais de Machines-Outils, Section 9250 for
SOCEMAS and Section 9251 forACEC-Berliet. These cases are discussed in detail in, Note,
Horizontal Integration of the Common Market Economy: Recent Decisions and Commu-
nications by the Commission of the European Communities, 6 TEX. INT'L. L. F. 259 (1970).
167JOLIET, supra, note 145 at 16.
16 8CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9081.
t 69 Markert in 5 TEX. INT'L. L. F., p. 5 1.
1701d., at 53-54. and Moss in 16 ANTITRUST BULL., pp. 444-445.
171 Westinghouse Investment Plans Draw Commission Rebuff, CCH COMMON MARKET
REP., Section 9327 (October 10, 1969, Commission Response to M.P. Glinne). U.S. Econom-
ic Penetration in Europe, CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9398 (November 10, 1970,
Commission Response to M.P. Glinne).
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That the question of direct investments by third countries in the countries of
the Common Market is of the utmost importance, and that the Community
should agree to take a common position on this matter... Furthermore, the
Commission believes that a Community policy is needed, and that the solu-
tion to the problem of striking a balance between Community and foreign
capital lies in the very dynamism of European industry itself.172
The EEC Commission has chided the member states for failure to cooperate
to prevent American take-overs of key sections of industry. The rebuke came
in an answer to a question from a member of the European Parliament on
Westinghouse's attempts to merge Belgian, French and Italian firms (in the
heavy electrical industry) into a Europe-wide group... The reply said that
foreign investment in Europe was an important asset but might sometimes be
inadvisable. The responsibility lay with the six governments to take measures
to solve the problems that usually underlie take-over bids, and though a
common policy was needed, European industry had to face up to foreign
competition.173
Without going so far as to advocate a protectionist attitude, the Commission
believes that investments across frontiers should develop with due regard for
the Community's rules of competition and ensure an adequate balance be-
tween the opportunities for foreign investments in the Community and those
given to Community investments in third countries.174
American direct investment in the EEC countries had only amounted to
$0.6 billion in 1950, but grew to $7.6 billion by 1966 and to $8.4 billion by
1967, with $407 million in profits being repatriated to the U.S. in 1967.175
By 1968, U.S. firms had $9 billion invested in EEC states, but this face
value only represents half of the market value of the holdings, and the
market value only represents half of the assets controlled by American
parent enterprises; thus in 1968 American-controlled assets within the
EEC amounted to over $30 billion.176
At the end of 1969 U.S. direct investment within the Common Market
totaled $10.2 billion, of which $4.25 billion was in Germany; 177 by the end
of 1970 the U.S. direct investment figure rose to $11.7 billion in the
EEC. 1 78 Within the Common Market in 1967, American enterprises ac-
quired 48 industrial interests while EEC enterprises made only 17 acquisi-
tions; during the same year U.S. firms established 93 industrial and 103
marketing subsidiaries while Common Market firms set up 43 industrial
and 104 marketing subsidiaries.179
172CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Sec. 9327, p. 8728.
173CCH COMMON MARKET REP., "Euromarket News," October 21, 1969, p. 2.174CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9384 (July 14, 1970, Commission Response to
M.P. Oule).
175RAHL, ed., Common Market and American Antitrust, pp. 34-35.
1 7 6CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9387 (August 18, 1970, Press Release by the
Commission), p. 8838.177Committee for Economic Development, The United States and the European Commu-
nity, New York, 1971, p. 72.
1781d., p. 34.
1 7 9CCH COMMON MARKET REP., Section 9387, pp. 8842-8843.
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Since 1962, non-EEC companies were involved in sixty-eight percent of
the mergers in the metal industry, sixty-five percent in the chemical in-
dustry, sixty-three percent in the food industry, and sixty-two percent in
textiles. 180 The resultant feelings of "(e)conomic dependence, loss of the
initiative to develop one's own national market because of the presence of
large and efficient and well-funded American companies, and the con-
comitant feeling of social and cultural dependence, all are very disturbing
to Europeans."' 181
It is in this light that one must view the Commission's decision against
the American Continental Can Co. 1 82 based on the acquisition by its
wholly owned subsidiary, Europemballage Corp. of Wilmington, Del. and
Brussels, Belgium, of majority control in Thomassen en Drijver-Verblifa
NV of Deventer, Netherlands. The decision began by holding that Conti-
nental Can was accountable for the conduct of its subsidiary Eu-
ropeemballage, and for the conduct of Schmalbach-Lubeca-Werke AG
(SLW), the German subsidiary of Europemballage. 183 Under Article 86 the
Commission had first to identify a "Dominant Position":
3. Enterprises are in a dominant position when it is possible for them to
take independent lines of condust and this enables them to act without
much regard for competitors, buyers, or suppliers...
4. Continental has a dominant position in Germany on the market for light
containers for canned meat and fish and for metal lids for glass jars. This
dominant position results from the shares which its subsidiary SLW
holds on the various market segments in the sector for light containers
and from the group's economic, financial, and technical importance.' 84
Then the Commission proceeded to find "Abuse of the Dominant Posi-
tion":
23. Where an enterprise that has a dominant position strengthens that posi-
tion through a concentration with another enterprise, with the result that
the competition, which actually or potentially might have subsisted in
spite of the existence of the dominant position, is virtually eliminated for
the products concerned in a substantial part of the Common Market, this
constitutes conduct that is incompatible with Article 86 of the Treaty...
25. For most of the metal containers they produced, there was a possibility
for Continental in Germany (SLW) and TDV to compete with each
other...
27. It should therefore be considered that SLW and TDV, prior to their
consolidation within Europemballage, were potential competitors in a
large common sphere of action, situated on both sides of the frontiers
between Germany and the Benelux countries...
28. This territory represents a substantial part of the Common Market. 185
1 8
°CCH COMMON MARKET REP. "Euromarket News," May 19, 1970, p. 3.
18 1RAHL, ed., COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST, p. 35.
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While no divestiture order was issued, Continental Can was required to
submit proposals to the Commission before July 1, 1972, in order to end its
violation of Article 86.186 In fact the Commission and Continental Can
could not arrive at a settlement and the case is inexorably headed toward
final resolution by the Court of Justice. 187
Although the Continental Can decision may be attacked for defining the
relevant market too narrowly (metal cans for fish and meat), for finding
market domination from operations in only one country (Germany), for
finding an abuse of dominant position in a merger eliminating an arguably
potential, but historically non-existent, competitor, and for holding that an
acquisition of control constituted abuse of a dominant position, 188 focusing
on the extraterritorial application of the EEC antitrust laws, the author's
main questions concerning the decision are:
1) Is the Commission's newly evident activism limited to attacking acquisi-
tions by non-EEC, especially American-controlled, firms, or will the Com-
mission now also move against intra-EEC mergers and acquisitions?
2) Will the Commission move directly against foreign companies, or will it
only act against acquisitions effectuated through EEC subsidiaries?
3) Will the Court of Justice uphold the application of Article 86 to cases in
which the alleged abuse consisted of the extension of a preexisting domi-
nant position through a merger?
It is felt that while the Commission will be selective in attacking acquisi-
tions and mergers, it will not hesitate to move either against EEC firms or
against foreign firms without active, pre-existing EEC subsidiaries. Fur-
ther, it is almost certain that the Court of Justice will sanction the use of
Article 86 to prevent undesirable mergers and acquisitions. As a con-
sequence of the strong, and not wholly unjustified fear of American busi-
ness domination that prevails within the Common Market and of the
latitude enjoyed by the Commission in the antitrust field, it is very possible
that in the future Article 86 will be utilized to prevent take-overs by
U.S.-controlled interests.
1 86 1d., at 9033.
'
81"Continental Can Says Case Against a Unit in Europe Moves Along," Wall Street
Journal, April 26, 1972, p. 10. "U.S. Can Maker Faces Court Action," June 29, 1972, p. 57.
188See, EEC Antitrust-Continental Can Company Held To Be in Violation of Article 86
of the Treaty of Rome, 5 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 357 (1972).
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